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Human communication, including language, is the product of underlying intentions that are 
purposely expressed, epistemically monitored and flexibly interpreted. A main question in 
science has been about the evolutionary origins of this cognitive capacity. One way to 
address the problem is by studying the natural communication of animals, particularly non-
human primates. As everything in biology, evolutionary transitions are gradual events, 
suggesting that intention may also have evolved in different stages as a function of 
increasing brainpower and cognitive complexity. In this chapter, I review empirical work on 
primate communication, which suggests that goal-directed intentional communication is 
well within the scope of animals, while simple mind-directed intentionality may be restricted 
to great apes and humans and shared intentionality may be an exclusively human capacity. 
1. Introduction
Scientific interest in primate communication has emerged as a mainstream research 
programme in the 1960s, particularly with pioneering fieldwork on vervet monkeys, 
which documented unprecedented complexity in vocal communication (Struhsaker 
1967). A particularly important finding was that this species was capable of producing 
acoustically distinct alarm calls to different predators, which elicited distinct 
behavioural reactions in recipients, as if the calls were meaningful to them (Seyfarth, 
Cheney & Marler 1980). This basic finding has since been replicated to other species, 
suggesting that basic referential capacities are a general feature of animal 
communication (Zuberbühler & Neumann 2017).  
The wider implications of these findings, however, have caused considerable debate. 
For instance, it became rapidly clear that primates, and animals in general, possess 
species-specific call repertoires, with different signals used in clearly defined 
situations, suggesting a strong genetic component. The contrast to human language 
turned out to be immense, with no signs of arbitrarily structured, culturally determined, 
and socially conventionalised utterances in any animal communication system. At the 
same time, the results of various artificial language projects demonstrated that some 
animals were very able to acquire and use symbols to communicate with their human 
caretakers and sometimes with each other e.g. (Segerdahl, Fields & Savage-
Rumbaugh 2005). Also, recent studies of spontaneous gesturing in great apes 
demonstrated high levels of production flexibility with clearly identifiable social goals 
(Call & Tomasello 2007). Overall, these findings created somewhat of a theoretical 
conundrum: How could the same individual, be able to produce visual signals in 
flexible, symbolic and intentional ways on the one hand, and on the other hand be so 
bound by hardwired and inflexible vocal signals (Seyfarth & Cheney 2011)? 
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2. Intentionality in animal communication 
There are at least two different notions of intentionality (Zuberbühler & Gomez in 
press). First, intentionality has been defined as aboutness, or "the power of minds to 
be about, to represent, or to stand for things, properties and states of affairs" (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy) (Searle 1983). Second, in developmental psychology 
intentionality is usually defined in terms of a commitment to carrying out an action with 
planning and forethought. This view has also been adopted by philosophers of 
language, who have pointed out that in human language the literal meaning of a 
linguistic utterance is often superseded by an underlying intended meaning (Grice, 
1969). In this view, intentional communication is conceptualised as goal-directedness, 
with our without reference to mental states. 
3. The intentional stance 
3.1  Levels of intentionality 
One particularly influential way of distinguishing between different types of 
intentionality has been proposed by (Dennett 1983). In human language 
speakers communicate to their social partners by producing highly structured 
vocal utterances to convey mental representations of objects or events. 
Different languages do this in different ways, but they are all capable of 
conveying and transmitting roughly the same mental content, either directly by 
literal meaning or indirectly by invoking intentions.  
Although vervet monkey alarm calls are undoubtedly part of this species' 
communicative repertoire, they share interesting properties with human 
language. In particular, playbacks of alarm calls given to eagles, leopards, and 
pythons cause others to respond in ways that suggest that the calls are 
meaningful to them. For instance, after hearing a snake alarm, monkeys 
respond by bipedally scanning the surrounding area, as if trying to locate the 
putative snake. Yet, these findings cannot determine whether monkeys 
delivered their signals with an intention to inform others, or as part of an inbuilt 
mechanism. To address this, Dennett (1983) proposed a theoretical framework, 
the 'intentional stance', to assess animal behaviour in relation to levels of 
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Intention Content         
0   order  A recognises x 
1st order   A wants B to x 
2nd order  A wants B to recognize x 
3rd order   A wants B to recognize that A wants B to x 
4th order A wants B to recognize that A wants B to recognise x 
5th order ….          
Table 1: Dennett's (1983) levels of intentionality in animal communication 
According to Dennet's model, 0-order intentionality attributes no intentionality to 
a monkey giving eagle alarm calls. Instead, the caller may simply react 
automatically to the perception of an eagle, which may trigger a distinct flavour 
of anxiety, linked to the production of a distinct signal, the eagle alarm. Due to 
the tight link between external event and signal, listeners can form simple 
associations, allowing them to react appropriately. Signallers and recipients, in 
other words, are not mentally connected during such events, and what looks like 
deliberate communication is nothing but an evolved system.  
3.2 First order intentionality  
However, if monkeys produced alarm calls with the specific purpose to influence 
each other's behaviour, they may be granted with first order intentionality. 
Several studies have suggested that this level is well within the cognitive 
capacities of non-human animals. In one striking example, male Thomas 
langurs produced alarm calls to a tiger model and continued to produce alarm 
calls until every group member had responded with an alarm call, as if to ensure 
that the predator had been perceived (Wich & de Vries 2006). Similarly, female 
Diana monkeys continue to alarm call to a predator, until their own male also 
produced his own matching alarm calls, in response to which they stop their 
vocal behaviour (Stephan & Zuberbuhler 2016).  
For great apes, there is also good evidence for first order intentional signalling. 
For instance, wild chimpanzee that are victims of aggression have been 
observed to "exaggerate" their victim screams, but only in the presence of high-
ranking audiences, as if to persuade them to come for help (Slocombe & 
Zuberbühler 2007). Also, prior to travel, chimpanzees sometimes produce 
distinct 'travel hoos' as part of a complex departure behaviour that includes 
audience checking and other signs of goal-directed behaviour (Gruber & 
Zuberbuehler 2013). 
Great apes also possess a rich repertoire of gestures, mostly produced during 
social interactions. These signals are delivered with some awareness of the 
audience, in the sense that they are socially directed and often produced with 
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goal-oriented persistence. For example, when shown the location of hidden 
food, one captive chimpanzee was able to direct a searching and ignorant 
human with gestures to the correct location (Roberts, Vick, Roberts & Menzel 
2014). In natural communication, bonobos use beckoning gestures to persuade 
sexual partners to follow them to a desired location, also with persistence and 
signal elaboration (Genty & Zuberbuhler 2014). Such goal-directed intentional 
signalling is also present in facial expressions, such as chimpanzee lip-
smacking during grooming, which is linked to longer and more reciprocal 
grooming bouts (Fedurek, Slocombe, Hartel & Zuberbuhler 2015). 
These results and other studies indicate that primate alarm calls are not just 
automatic and direct responses to external events, but the product of at least 
first-order intentionality, according to Dennett's (1983) scale. 
3.3 Second-order intentionality: Communication as mental state 
attribution 
The evidence reviewed so far is consistent with the idea that primates are at 
least capable of first-order intentionality, which is particularly visible during ape 
gesturing but also in some vocal behaviour. But are primates also able to take 
into account each other's mental states when producing and understanding 
signals? The fact that signallers are sometimes influenced by the presence of 
specific audiences does not provide very strong evidence, as this could be 
explained by subconscious 'implicit' rather than conscious, goal-directed 
cognition. To this end, it would be necessary to demonstrate that signallers not 
only show signs of 'wanting' a recipient to do something specific, but also of 
wanting to be understood. Behavioural evidence for this requires monitoring and 
acting upon an addressee's mental state, such as a percept, desire or belief.  
There is relatively strong evidence that great apes at least can make judgments 
about what others can or cannot see. For example, before gesturing, great apes 
sometimes try to attract the attention of an addressee, suggesting that they are 
aware of the other's visual attention (Hostetter, Cantero & Hopkins 2001). Other 
studies suggest that great apes can go beyond mere visual perception and 
attribute knowledge to others. For example, when interacting with a familiar or 
unfamiliar human caretaker, and when reluctant to hand over food, bonobos 
were more likely to repeat their gestures to a familiar keeper and more likely to 
elaborate their gestures to an unfamiliar one, as if taking into account their 
knowledge differences (Genty, Neumann & Zuberbuhler 2015). In the vocal 
domain, the most progress has been made with chimpanzees reacting to snake 
models. In one study, it was shown that alert calls to snakes were more common 
if signalers were in the company of unaware audiences compared to 
knowledgeable ones (Crockford, Wittig, Mundry & Zuberbuhler 2012; Crockford, 
Wittig & Zuberbuhler 2015). 
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In sum, there is some evidence that great apes at least are able to take into 
account the mental states of others when communicating to them. Higher orders 
of intentionality, such as the active desire to instill a mental state, however, may 
be beyond the cognitive capacities of animals. 
3.4 Intention as aboutness 
As outlined before, there is another sense of intentionality, intention as 
aboutness. In this view, a signal is emitted or understood as being about an 
object. In the vervet monkey example, a receiver may interpret an eagle alarm 
call as indicating, not just that there is an eagle, but also that a caller has found 
an eagle and that the alarm call is about the eagle (Zuberbühler & Gomez in 
press). Obviously, it is much more challenging to find clear behavioural 
indicators for signal processing at this level. There is some evidence that some 
primates perceive intentionality in the communication behaviour of others, but 
this only partially fulfils the required criteria. For example, free-ranging baboons 
can distinguish between calls directed at themselves and calls directed at other 
individuals (Engh, Hoffmeier, Cheney & Seyfarth 2006). In chimpanzees, victims 
of aggressions will retreat from the playback of aggressive barks given by an 
ally of the former opponent, but ignore the same barks if given by other group 
members, even hours after the conflict (Wittig, Crockford, Langergraber & 
Zuberbuhler 2014). In sum, when witnessing vocal signals, baboons, 
chimpanzees and probably other primates seem to understand something about 
the targeted recipient, an ability required to recognize others' intentions and 
motives. 
3.5 Shared intentionality 
A recent proposal has been that humans are not only capable of higher orders 
of intentionality, but that they are additionally able to perceive others' intentions 
and align them with their own (Tomasello & Moll 2010). This ability to share 
goals and intentions when participating in collaborative activities has been 
linked with powerful forms of mindreading and a motivation to share mental 
states with others, to enter some kind of shared cognitive representation of joint 
intentions (Zuberbühler & Gomez in press). The proposal is that the implications 
of this ability are enormous, by enabling subjects to create linguistic 
conventions, social norms and social institutions. Although great apes 
understand the basics of intentional action, and may use communicative signals 
to affect others' intentions, they do not appear to reach the level of shared 
intentionality. The primary reason may well be that sharing intentions 
necessitates an ability to not only perceive the mental states of others, but also 
to have a desire to change them in ways that enable joint intention. 
4. Conclusions 
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There is good evidence that primates and possibly many other groups of 
animals use vocal and gestural signals in a goal-directed, first-order 
intentionality sense, as proposed by Dennett (1983). The evidence is less strong 
for second-order intentionality in communication, although numerous other 
studies have shown that great apes at least are able to attribute mental states 
to others, suggesting that this capacity should also reveal itself during acts of 
communication. However, there is no clear evidence that any animal has the 
capacity to want to influence another's mental state, which may prevent them 
from sharing intentionality with each other. 
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